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PATENT INFRINGEMENT AMIDST RAPIDLY
EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES: NEW
EQUIVALENTS, THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS AND THE REVERSE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following: A company invests millions of dollars
into a research and development project. The expenditure creates
no guarantee that a marketable technology will result to recoup the
vast investment. Fortunately, the investment does in fact yield a
novel invention.1 In fact, the invention is such an advance that it is
considered a "pioneer." To prevent others from exploiting the
fruits of this investment, patent protection is sought: a patent appli-
cation is promptly filed with the Patent Office.2 Acknowledging the
pioneering nature of the invention, the Patent Office proceeds to
issue a patent with broad claims3 which ostensibly offer wide pro-
prietary protection for the technology. The invention immediately
becomes a resounding commercial success.
Anxious to exploit the market created by the new technology, a
second company introduces a competing product. The originating
company, fortified by its patent, counters in court by establishing
that the claims of its patent clearly cover the competitor's product.
The court acknowledges this clearly established case; however, it
ultimately rules that there is no infringement.' Its holding is not
based on the patent statutes, rather, it is grounded in a judicially
created doctrine. The court, acting outside the patent statutes, has
nullified the originating company's vast investment.
Judicial precedent makes the foregoing hypothetical a reality.
This peculiar and seemingly unjust situation is especially plausible
in rapidly evolving technologies such as electronics5 or biotechnol-
1. The invention may be in the form of a machine, manufacture, composition of mat-
ter or process - the categories for a patentable invention. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1989).
2. The United States Patent and Trademark Office is a branch of the Department of
Commerce charged with administration of the Patent Laws, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1989) and
the Trademark Laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1989).
3. See infra p. 82.
4. See infra p. 82.
5. "Electronics is the science and technology of the passage of charged particles in a
gas, in a vacuum, or in a semiconductor." J. MILLMAN, MICROELECTRONICS DIGITAL AND
ANALOG CIRCurrs AND SYSTEM xvii (1979). At a practical level, electronics includes the
familiar disciplines of computers and communications. These disciplines may be placed
under the rubric of "information manipulation." Information manipulation may be in the
1990]
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ogy. 6 Particularly in those areas, judicial precedent indicates that
patent infringement may be avoided when improvements made pos-
sible by the evolution of technology are simply integrated into a new
product.
This paper examines patent protection amidst rapidly evolving
technologies by considering the role of the "reverse doctrine of
equivalents,"' 7  the "doctrine of equivalents ' 8  and "new
equivalents" 9 in judicial analyses of patent infringement. The paper
initially examines the ideological underpinnings of the patent sys-
tem. Subsequently, judicial infringement analyses are considered.
This entails scrutiny of claim construction, literal infringement, the
reverse doctrine of equivalents, the doctrine of equivalents, and new
equivalents.
From those foundations, the paper endeavors to demonstrate
that as rapidly evolving technologies generate improvements which
constitute new equivalents, this is in turn compelling a diminishing
role for the widely used doctrine of equivalents and a concomitant
increasing role for the sparsely used reverse doctrine of equivalents.
The paper proposes that, at least in the realm of rapidly evolving
technologies, this is a salutary transition which should be fostered,
notwithstanding recent precedent which arguably misapplies the re-
spective doctrines.
II. THE PROGRESS AND PROTECTION OF THE USEFUL ARTS
A. The Ideology of the Patent Grant
That inventors are entitled to be rewarded for their efforts is a
longstanding, equitable proposition. In reference to his discovery of
form of storage of information, sorting, computation, information retrieval, and transmission
of data. Applications of information manipulation are almost unlimited; presently, informa-
tion manipulation is routinely used in a variety of disciplines: law, engineering, education,
defense, publishing, management control, reservation systems, banking and medicine. Id. at
xxvii.
6. "'[B]iotechnology' . . .refers to recombinant DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid),
monoclonal antibody technology and similar technology primarily used in the
pharmaceutical industry. The end-result of such laboratory manipulation may
take the form of a genetic sequence intentionally encoded in the DNA. It may
also take the form of: 1) a substance which will locate and attach to designated
cells; 2) a means of mass producing a particular cell line; or 3) a new chemical
marketable as a drug."
Comment, Enemies to Innovation: Protecting Biotechnology Inventions, 5 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 437, 439 (1989).
7. See infra p. 86.
8. See infra p. 87.
9. See infra p. 89.
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a machine for inexpensively and conveniently irrigating land, in
1594 Galileo suggested to the Doge of Venice:
It not being fit that this invention, which is my own, discovered
by me with great labor and much expense, be made the common
property of everybody, I humbly petition Your Serene Highness
that you deign to favor me with that which by your benignity is
readily granted to any expert in every profession in similar cases;
that is, that no one but myself or my heirs or those obtaining the
right from me or from them be allowed to make, cause to be
made, or, if made, use my said new instrument, nor with altera-
tions to apply it to other uses. By reason thereof, I shall the
more attentively apply myself to new inventions for universal
benefit.10
The law in the United States has accommodated the longstand-
ing interests of Galileo and other inventors. Today, inventors need
not "humbly petition" the government because the Constitution
grants Congress "the power to promote the progress of... the
useful arts by securing for.., inventors the exclusive rights to their
... discoveries."
11
This Constitutional provision acknowledges that inventors'
"great labor and much expense" should be rewarded. Thomas Jef-
ferson recognized the importance of this type of remuneration stat-
ing, "ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement."12
The Constitutional provision also embraces the idea that given
a proprietary interest in an invention, an inventor "shall the more
attentively apply [himself or herself] to new inventions for universal
benefit." 13 Abraham Lincoln expressed this idea in another way,
maintaining that patents provide "the fuel of interest to the fire of
genius.'"14
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the ideology that a
patent provides universal benefit while rewarding individual effort:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Con-
10. 1 DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 6, at 38 (2d ed. 1964).
11. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states in its entirety that: "Congress shall have the
power.., to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
The references to "science," "authors," and "writings" form the bases of the copyright laws,
while the references to "usefull arts," "inventors," and "discoveries" serve as the bases for the
patent laws. See 1 DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 10, at 75-77 (2d ed. 1964).
12. Wyman, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent System, I J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 5, 7 (1918).
13. Aside from the "universal benefit" of expanded knowledge, innovation has the prac-
tical result of producing new industries, jobs and consumer goods. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal
Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 228 U.S.P.Q. 90 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
14. 1 DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 9, at 61 (2d ed. 1964).
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gress to grant patents... is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of... inventors in ... useful
Arts. Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 15
Pursuant to the Constitutional grant of authority and its sur-
rounding ideology, Congress has enacted a series of statutes to pro-
vide patent protection for acquired technology.1 6 If an invention
satisfies the statutory requirements for a patentable invention, I7 the
government rewards the inventor, for a limited period," with a
grant of exclusive rights in the invention.9
In exchange for this grant of exclusive rights, the inventor pro-
vides a written disclosure of the invention.2 ° The written disclosure
forms part of the application for a patent. This disclosure, generally
known as a specification, must include: a description of the inven-
tion, a description of the manner of making and using the invention,
and a description of what the inventor considers to be the "best
mode" of the invention.2'
Upon expiration of the patent, the specification will entitle and
"enable any person skilled in the art to which [the invention] per-
tains... to make and use the same. ''22 The teaching or "enabling"
nature of the patent is generally referred to as "enablement." En-
15. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 100 U.S.P.Q. 325, 333 (1954). In Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262, 201 U.S.P.Q. 1, 4 (1979), the court stated:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes dis-
closure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public
to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent require-
ments for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain re-
main there for the free use of the public.
16. The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (1989) is the present statutory source
of patent law in the United States.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1989) (Inventions patentable); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1989) (Conditions
for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1989) (Conditions for
patentability; non-obvious subject matter).
18. The patent grant is for a term of 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1989).
19. A patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using or selling her pat-
ented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1989).
20. "In return for a patent, the inventor gives as consideration a complete revelation or
disclosure of the invention for which protection is sought." U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 608, at 600-26 (11th ed. 1989).
21. These requirements are set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (1989) which states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (1989).
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ablement extracts the nuances of the invention and places it in the
possession of the public. Enablement, coupled with the right to use
the invention upon expiration of the patent term, is the benefit the
public receives in return for the detriment of granting time delim-
ited exclusive rights.23
The specification also includes "one or more claims particu-
larly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention."24 The claims describe the
"metes and bounds" of the invention.25 An analogy between metes
and bounds in real property and intellectual property is readily
made. As articulated by the Supreme Court, "[a] patent for an in-
vention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on
the same foundation and is surrounded and protected by the same
sanctions."26 The patent holder's property rights are protected
from trespassing through a variety of sanctions imposed upon those
who infringe those property rights.27 The power to preclude others
from infringing is the essence of the patent grant.28 Infringement
23. Social costs of the patent system include underutilization of patented processes or
products and thus higher prices during the period of exclusive rights; discouragement of fur-
ther research by others where the results would be covered by a pioneer patent; the induce-
ment of wasteful research in an attempt to circumvent a patent; and resources expended
bargaining for licenses and litigating patents. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 318-
324 (1st ed. 1967).
The Federal Circuit views research motivated by a desire to circumvent a patent as
beneficial, such research fosters a steadfast process of innovation. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 224 U.S.P.Q. 418 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Accord In re Hogan, 559
F.2d 595, 606, 194 U.S.P.Q. 527, 538 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("Indeed, encouragement of improve-
ments on prior inventions is a major contribution of the patent system and the vast majority
of patents are issued on improvements."). Further, the Federal Circuit does not view patents
as monopolies, thus, in that court's view, patents do not represent an exception to the anti-
trust laws. See Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 218 U.S.P.Q. 698 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 112, V 2 (1989). Claims in patents are drafted in the form of a pream-
ble, transition and one or more elements. For instance, a claim may read: "A noisemaker
comprising a bell, attached to a whistle, attached to a gong." "A noisemaker" is the pream-
ble; "comprising" is the transistion; the "bell" is an element of the combination, as are the
"whistle" and "gong." See generally 2 D. CHISUM, PATENTS, § 8.06[1][b] (1989).
25. The "metes and bounds" define the territory protected by the patent; this territory
is distinguishable from the "prior art" - what was known previously. In re Vamco Mach. and
Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 224 U.S.P.Q. 617 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
26. Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876).
27. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271-294 (1989).
28. Property is commonly defined in terms of the authority to exclude others. Insofar
as a patentee possesses the right of exclusion, the patentee enjoys a substantive property right
in the intellectual property embodied in the patent. Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713
F.2d 782, 218 U.S.P.Q. 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Galileo requested a property right, a right of exclusion: "[N]o one but myself or my heirs
or those obtaining the right from me or from them be allowed to make, cause to be made, or
if made, use my said new instrument." See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Note that
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occurs when the metes and bounds of a claim are transgressed. At-
tention now turns to the inquiry surrounding an infringement
analysis.
B. The Infringement Analysis
While it is presumed that a patent is valid,2 9 it is incumbent
upon the patent holder to establish infringement.30 The proof in
that regard must represent a preponderance of the evidence.3
A determination of patent infringement entails a two prong
analysis: first, the scope of the relevant claim is established; sec-
ond, it is determined whether the claim, interpreted as such, covers
the accused device.32 Claim scope, or claim interpretation, is a
question of law33 which involves many factual inquiries.3 4 On the
other hand, the second prong, whether a claim covers an accused
device - whether the accused device infringes - is a question of
fact.3 5
Attention now turns to the first prong of the analysis - claim
interpretation. The second prong will be analyzed subsequently. In
the latter case, particular attention will be focused upon two situa-
tions: first, where a claim literally covers a device, but infringement
does not occur - reverse doctrine of equivalents; second, where a
claim does not literally cover a device, but infringement neverthe-
less occurs - doctrine of equivalents.
1. Claim Interpretation
The claims establish the metes and bounds. of the patent
right.3 6 Once the metes and bounds of the claim are established, the
Galileo's request was for the exclusive right to make and use his invention, United States
patent law grants the exclusive right to exlude others from making, using or selling a patented
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1989).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1989) states, in relevant part, "A patent shall be presumed valid."
The patent office may invalidate a patent claim in a reexamination process, 35 U.S.C. § 307
(1989), otherwise it is the courts' responsibility to pass judgment on the validity of a patent.
30. Under Sea Indus. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1772 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
31. Bene v. Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683 (1889).
32. Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 226 U.S.P.Q. 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
33. McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 221 U.S.P.Q. 944 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
34. Perini America, Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 832 F.2d 581, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1621 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
35. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 230
U.S.P.Q. 45 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
36. See supra p. 81.
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remainder of the analysis is routine.37
In interpreting claims, the language is assumed to represent its
ordinary meaning. 38 The patentee, however, is said to be her own
"lexicographer ' 39 and therefore can employ any desired terminol-
ogy so long as its meaning is clear.' The claim language is con-
strued in light of the specification.4' Other claims in the patent may
be used to determine the scope of a particular claim.42 Where the
prosecution history 3 sheds light on claim meaning, it too may be
utilized for claim interpretation.'
Since most inventions include a number of elements, claims are
commonly written in the form of a combination.45 Each element46
of a claim represents a limitation on claim scope. Thus, claim inter-
pretation dictates that the more elements in a claim, the narrower
its metes and bounds.47
Close scrutiny of the specification is required when interpreting
claims which include elements written in "means-plus-function"
form.48 Such elements call for a function to be performed. The
means for accomplishing that function are set forth in the specifica-
37. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1593 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
38. Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 221 U.S.P.Q. 473 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
39. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 U.S.P.Q. 303 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
40. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 228 U.S.P.Q. 305 (D.
Mass. 1985), aff'd, 789 F.2d 1556, 229 U.S.P.Q. 561 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S.
850 (1986).
41. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).
42. McGill, Inc. v. John Zink, Co., 736 F.2d 666, 221 U.S.P.Q. 944 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
43. Prosecution history is the record of proceedings in the Patent Office. When an ex-
aminer rejects claims, the patentee will offer arguments and/or amendments to overcome the
examiner's rejections. These documents become a part of the prosecution history or "file
wrapper." See generally 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS, § 18.05 (1989).
44. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 229 U.S.P.Q. 805 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
45. Essentially every invention utilizes known principles and combines known elements.
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452,221 U.S.P.Q.
481 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See supra note 24.
46. See supra note 24.
47. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prod., Inc., 586F.2d 917, 924, 199 U.S.P.Q. 641,
647 (2d Cir. 1978) "The aphorism that 'in a patent claim, more means less' is true."
48. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 6 (1989) provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corre-
sponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
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tion.49 The patentee is not restricted to the disclosed means,5"
rather, when construing the claims, one must consider equivalent
means which accomplish the same function.
"Equivalent" in a means-plus-function sense is distinct from
"equivalent" in terms of the doctrine of equivalents. 51 A means-
plus-function equivalent is determined by the claim language, the
patent specification, the prosecution history, other claims in the pat-
ent, and expert testimony.52
Since claims are construed before applying them to the alleg-
edly infringing device, a particularly intractable problem arises, es-
pecially in relation to interpreting means-plus-function claims.
Specifically, one interpreting such claims must consider a plurality
of "means" which will perform each specified function. In other
words, for each means-plus-function element of the combination
claimed, one must consider hypothetical means which are
equivalent to those disclosed in the specification. Thus, a non-tech-
nologically trained judge or jury is forced into an exercise of in-
venting what would represent a technological equivalent to the
invention disclosed in the patent. This practice of determining
equivalents by drawing the metes and bounds of such equivalents in
some abstract sphere, detached from the accused device, has been
criticized.53
.A finding of identical function without a finding of equivalent
49. For instance, a claim element may read, "means for simultaneously activating the
bell, whistle, and gong," The "means", perhaps a string attaching the bell, whistle and gong,
is particularly described in the specification. The "function" is the simultaneous activation of
the bell, whistle and gong. See generally 2 D. CHISUM, PATENTs, § 8.04[2] (1989).
50. In reference to means-plus-function equivalents, the Federal Circuit stated in Texas
Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563, 231 U.S.P.Q.
833, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1986), opinion on denial of rehearing, 846 F.2d 1369, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1886
(Fed. Cir. 1988), rehearing in banc denied, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1414 (Fed. Cir. 1988) that: "The
purpose is to grant the inventor of a combination invention a fair scope that is not dependent
on a catalogue of alternative embodiments in the specification. This court has cautioned
against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the
specification."
51. D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 225 U.S.P.Q. 236 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 226 U.S.P.Q. 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
52. Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 226 U.S.P.Q. 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
53. In R. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 102 (1988), the author
states:
With all respect it is suggested this this procedure is unworkable from a practi-
cal standpoint. It is extremely difficult to verbalize a claim construction except
by reference to an accused structure or process. Indeed, one often cannot define
the construction issues without knowing the reasons why the accused infringer
is arguing lack of literalism. In the experience of this author, claims are never,
in practice, construed except in the context of the accused device. Does this
prohibition mean that any reference to the accused infringement prior to actual
[Vol. 6
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structure is insufficient to establish means-plus-function equiva-
lence. 4 Means-plus-function form of claim drafting is widely used
in electronic and biotechnology patents since this form is perceived
as providing the broadest protection.55
2. Literal Infringement
Once the breadth of the claims are construed using the forego-
ing criteria, the second prong of the infringement analysis requires a
determination of whether the claims cover the accused device. The
Supreme Court has stated: "In determining whether an accused de-
vice or composition infringes a valid patent, resort must be had in
the first instance to the words of the claim. If accused matter falls
clearly within the claim, infringement is made out and that is the
end of it."'56  In other words, if the claims "read on" the accused
device, literal infringement exists. While literal infringement re-
quires that the accused device embody every element of the claim,
"this does not require a slavish conformity to words of
insignificance."57
claim construction constitutes error? The court is urged to rethink this
reasoning.
54. In Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1226 (1988) the court stated: "In essence,
Pennwalt erroneously argues that, if an accused structure performs the function required by
the claim, it is per se structurally equivalent. That view entirely eliminates the section 112,
paragraph 6, restriction and has been rejected in the above-cited precedent of this court."
Similarly, in Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1357, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
1290, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the court stated:
In determining equivalence under section 112, the "sole question is whether
the single means in the accused device which performs the function stated in
the claim is the same as or an equivalent of the corresponding structure de-
scribed in the patentee's specification as performing that function." [T]he court
must compare the accused structure with the'disclosed structure, and must find
equivalent structure as well as identity of claimed function for that structure.
(emphasis in original).
55. Many patent lawyers use means plus function claims because the word
"means" is totally unrestricted and the function performed by the "means" can
be recited broadly. Consequently, a claim can be drafted which includes ele-
ments each of which on its face is directed to every structure for performing a
recited function.
Manzo, "Means" Claims in Patent Infringement Litigation, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 97, 98 (1986). Accord Loughran, Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International
Trade Commission: The Federal Circuit's Prescription for Infringement Without Fear?, 5
COMPUTER L. REP. 512 (1987) ("[M]eans-plus-function clauses, a type of claim language
that is crucial to securing effective patent protection in fast-moving art areas.").
56. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607, 85 U.S.P.Q.
328, 330 (1950).
57. Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prod. Co., 757 F.2d 255, 257, 225
U.S.P.Q. 240, 241 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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a. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
Even if the accused matter clearly conforms to the words of the
claim, that is not necessarily the end of the infringement inquiry.
The Supreme Court has set forth that once it is established that the
words of a claim read on a device, the accused infringer is entitled
to prove non-infringement under the "reverse doctrine of
equivalents."158
The reverse doctrine of equivalents is a judicially created equi-
table doctrine which prevents a patentee from claiming exclusive
rights to inventive material dissimilar from her own, yet still within
the literal parameters of her claims. The seminal articulation of the
doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co. 59 where the Court stated that:
[Where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented
article that it performs the same or a similar function in a sub-
stantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal
words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to
restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for
infringement.
In Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co.,' the Court analogized
the situation to where one has violated the letter of a statute, but
"has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent."
58. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328
(1950); SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 227 U.S.P.Q. 577 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). Graver Tank and SRI establish that the reverse doctrine of equivalents is utilized
by the accused infringer after a finding of literal infringement. Thus, it is incorrect to require
the patentee to establish equivalence between the patented invention and the accused matter
prior to a finding of literal infringement, as some courts and commentators have suggested. In
Lockwood v. Langendorf United Bakeries, Inc., 324 F.2d 82, 88, 139 U.S.P.Q. 220, 224-25
(9th Cir. 1963), the court stated:
Even if a claim can be read in terms upon an accused article, infringement does
not necessarily follow unless it can be found as an ultimate fact that the article
uses the inventor's idea as embodied in the inventor's design and drawings and
that there is sameness or equivalence of function and means.
Similarly, in Pigott, Equivalents in Reverse, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 291, 291-92 (1966), the
author stated:
It is well settled that merely because the claims in suit taken literally read
element by element on the accused device does not establish infringement, nor
does it establish a presumption of infringement. [The patentee] must establish
substantial identity of means, operation and result.
59. 339 U.S. 605, 608-09, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 330 (1950). Stated in another way: "IThe
[reverse doctrine of equivalents] requires reading into a patent claim, limitations which are
not literally in the claim in order to give the claim a more narrowed interpretation."
Bozicevic, The 'Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents' in the World of Reverse Transcriptase, 71 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 353, 354 (1989).
60. 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898).
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The sound policy undergirding the reverse doctrine of
equivalents provides that the patentee is entitled to exclusive rights
only for that material which he has enabled. He should not be able
to claim something far removed in principle from his own teach-
ing.61 This policy is embraced in one court's statement: "The patent
law is designed to protect the originality and technical merit of the
device, not to reward the literary skills of those drafting patent
claims."'62
3. The Doctrine of Equivalents
If a patentee applies the claims to the accused device and those
claims do not literally read on the device, the patentee may still
establish infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The doc-
trine of equivalents is also judicially created; it is "devised to do
equity" where literal infringement is absent, but liability is appro-
priate "to prevent what is in essence a pirating of a patentee's
invention.
'6 3
In Graver Tank,' the Supreme Court stated that the doctrine
is in response to the fact that: "[o]ne who seeks to pirate an inven-
tion... may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal
and shelter the piracy. Outright and forthright duplication is a dull
and very rare type of infringement."65 The Court went on to hold
that when a device "performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result" as the pat-
ented device, then infringement occurs, notwithstanding the literal
language of the claims.66
61. In S. BENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE
322 (1987), the author states that the reverse doctrine of equivalents:
[I]s a doctrine of considerable practical significance when it comes to interpret-
ing broad claims in any field of technology, including biotechnology, especially
claims that employ functional expressions for the very purpose of seeking a
broad scope of protection. In essence, the RDE stands for the proposition that
the patentee has overclaimed his or her invention, and the scope of protection
will be restricted to what was actually invented. (emphasis in original).
62. Mechanical Plastics Corp. v. Unifast Indus., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 502, 504, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1734, 1736 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
63. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870, 228 U.S.P.Q. 90, 96 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
In Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 222 U.S.P.Q. 929 (Fed. Cir. 1984) the
court suggested that the doctrine of equivalents also serves to protect the patentee from the
development of new equivalents. See infra p. 89.
Galileo also requested a type of doctrine of equivalents, he asked that his invention not
be practiced "with alterations." See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
64. 339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328 (1950).
65. Id. at 607, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 330.
66. Id. at 609-10, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 330. The Court also stated that:
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When a court employs the doctrine of equivalents it is ex-
panding the outer periphery of the claims. In other words, there is
no literal infringement, but in the name of equity, the court endeav-
ors to expand the metes and bounds of the claims to encompass the
accused device. This is done by assuming that the specification ena-
bled the permutations of the accused device. Claim scope is ex-
panded in proportion to the instructive contribution of the
invention. Thus, a "pioneer" patent is entitled to a broad range of
equivalents." This privilege naturally stems from the principle that
the inventor who has enabled a vast improvement in the useful arts
should be rewarded commensurately.
The range of equivalents is professed to be distinct from
means-plus-function equivalents.68 This range is determined by the
pioneer or non-pioneer status of the invention, the prosecution his-
tory and the prior art.6 9
While the doctrine intends to do equity, it introduces uncer-
tainty into the law. As a result of the doctrine, claim language
alone is not sufficient to determine the scope of the invention: muta-
ble equivalents must be considered. Consequently, the public does
not know where the patent boundary terminates.70  Tension also
A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact. Proof can be made in any
form: through testimony of experts or others versed in the technology; by doc-
uments, including texts and treatises; and, of course, by the disclosures of the
prior art. Like any other issue of fact, final determination requires a balancing
of credibility, persuasiveness and weight of evidence.
67. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 222 U.S.P.Q. 929 (Fed. Cir. 1984); "The
decisions recognize at least three categories: pioneers, entitled to a broad range of equivalents;
marked improvements, entitled to a substantial range of equivalents; and narrow improve-
ments, entitled to limited or no range of equivalents." 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.04 [2] at
18-85 (1989).
68. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
69. D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 225 U.S.P.Q. 236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
70. Justice Black, dissenting in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339
U.S. 605, 617, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 333-34 (1950) stated:
Hereafter a manufacturer cannot rely on what the language of a patent claims.
He must be able, at the peril of heavy infringement damages, to forecast how
far a court relatively unversed in a particular technological field will expand
the claim's language after considering the testimony of technical experts in that
field. To burden business enterprise on the assumption that men possess such a
prescience bodes ill for the kind of competititive economy that is our professed
goal.
Similarly, the dissenting opinion in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 338, 347 (1853)
admonished:
Fulness, clearness, exactness, preciseness, and particularity, in the description
of the invention, its principle, and of the matter claimed to be invented, will
alone fulfill the demands of congress or the wants of the country. Nothing, in
the administration of this law, will be more mischievous, more productive of
oppressive and costly litgation, of exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexa-
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surrounds the application of the doctrine. The articulation of the
doctrine-whether the device "performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result"--
provides little in terms of an analytical framework. There is even
disagreement over whether the test is for the "same work" or "sub-
stantially the same work."71
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
struggled with the question of whether the doctrine of equivalents is
applied to "the invention as a whole" or on an "element by ele-
ment" basis.72 The "element by element" faction requires that the
accused device possess each element of the claim or an equivalent
thereof. The opposing viewpoint concentrates on equivalents in a
broader sense: as the "invention as a whole". This faction would
not require literal correspondence between every element of the
claims and the accused device; it would find infringement if the "in-
vention as a whole" read on the accused device. The dispute seems
to have been resolved in favor of the "element by element"
faction.73
4. New Equivalents
The idea of "new equivalents" is readily appreciated. Take, for
example, a situation wherein an inventor obtains a patent for a com-
bination in which one element of that combination is a high inten-
sity light that is to be utilized as part of the invention. Suppose
further, that subsequent to the patenting of the invention, lasers are
developed. Utilization of the laser in the combination enables more
efficient operation of the invention. In such a circumstance the la-
ser is a new equivalent to the high intensity light source.74
Substitution of a new equivalent element into a combination of
elements once avoided infringement. 75 However, the Federal Cir-
tious demands, more injurious to labor, than a relaxation of these wise and
salutary requisitions of the act of congress.
71. See Harris, Three Ambiguities of the Doctrine of Equivalents in the Federal Circuit,
69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 91 (1987); Player, ElementalEjuivalence: Interpreting
"Substantially the Same Way" under Pennwalt after Corning Glass, 71 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. Soc'Y 546 (1989).
72. See Hantman, Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 511
(1988); Nieman, The Federal Circuit Resolves Ambiguities in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 153 (1988); Harris, Three Ambiguities in the Doctrine of
Equivalents in the Federal Circuit, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 91 (1987).
73. Nieman, The Federal Circuit Resolves Ambiguities in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 70
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 153 (1988).
74. See Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866, 180 U.S.P.Q.
609 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874, 183 U.S.P.Q. 321 (1974).
75. See 7 DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 546, at 545-46 (2d ed. 1964).
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cuit has stressed that an inventor is not required to predict all future
developments which enable another to practice his invention in sub-
stantially the same way.76 Thus, "mere substitution of an embel-
lishment made possible by technological advances does not avoid
infringement."77 This dictates that equivalence is determined as of
the time the infringement takes place. 78
The principle of new equivalents is graphically revealed in
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.79 The patent at issue was for a
satellite claimed in combination form."0 In the patented device, a
signal was sent to earth, calculations were then performed based on
that signal. Afterwards, a responding signal was sent back to the
satellite which used the signal to adjust its direction. Subsequently
developed microprocessor"1 technology allowed certain calcula-
tions to simply be made on board the satellite, obviating certain
communications with the ground crew. The Federal Circuit did not
allow this improved element to be utilized to avoid infringement.
Hughes suggests the importance of the concept of new
equivalents in rapidly evolving technologies. In Hughes, rapidly
evolving electronic technology enabled a dramatic improvement in
the manner in which an invention was practiced. It is readily ap-
preciable that other improvements in technology will alter the man-
ner in which other inventions are practiced.
Substitution of a single element of the combination in Hughes
was not enough to circumvent infringement. However, what if a
number of improved elements are integrated into a claimed combi-
nation? This was the situation facing the Court in Texas Instru-
ments, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission.8"
This case is particularly scrutinized as it provides recent appellate
court analysis of claim interpretation, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents, the doctrine of equivalents and new equivalents.
76. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
77. Id. at 1365, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 483.
78. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 224 U.S.P.Q.
409 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
79. 717 F.2d 1351, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
80. See supra note 24.
81. A microprocessor is a single-chip computer element that contains a control unit,
central processing circuitry, and arithmetic and logic functions, it is suitable for use as the
central processing unit of a microcomputer or a dedicated automatic control system. R. TUR-
NER & S. GIBILIsco, THE ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 365 (4th ed. 1988).
82. 805 F.2d 1558, 231 U.S.P.Q. 833 (Fed. Cir. 1986), opinion on denial of rehearing,
846 F.2d 1369, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1886 (Fed. Cir. 1988), rehearing in banc denied, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
1414 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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C. The Decision in Texas Instruments
Texas Instruments reached the Federal Circuit83 on Texas In-
strument's (hereinafter TI) appeal from the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission's (hereinafter ITC)"4 decision. 5 The ITC
held that certain imported calculators did not infringe TI's U.S.
Patent Number 3,819,921 (hereinafter '921) entitled "Miniature
Electronic Calculator."86 The Federal Circuit affirmed, but on dif-
ferent grounds.
1. The Technology
The '921 patent embodies the technology representing the first
hand-held calculator. The court acknowledged the patent's pio-
neering nature by noting that the prototype is presently part of the
permanent collection at the Smithsonian Museum of History and
Technology. 87
The primary claim calls for a combination with the first three
elements written in means-plus-function form. 8 Those elements in-
dude: (a) input means; (b) electronic means responsive to the sig-
nals from the keyboard; and (c) means for providing visual display
of the resultant calculations.
TI urged that its enumerated means-plus-function elements di-
rectly read on an analogue in the accused devices. TI further
averred that although the accused devices did not utilize the precise
embodiments found in its specification, in light of the patent's pio-
neering nature, it was entitled to a broad range of equivalents.8 9 In
response to these arguments, the court reviewed the lower court's
analysis of the technology of the '921 patent in contrast to that tech-
nology embodied in the accused devices.
83. The Federal Circuit, since its establishment in October of 1982, has maintained
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases which arise in whole or in part under the patent
laws. See generally Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982 - And Beyond, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 543 (1983).
84. The United States International Trade Commission, among other things, is charged
with the responsibility of enforcing 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1989) which prohibits unfair methods
of competition, and more specifically, unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United
States.
85. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d 1558, 1558, 231 U.S.P.Q. 833, 833.
86. The judgment below also held, ironically, that TI does not produce calculators in
accordance with the '921 patent. Id. at 1558, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 833.
87. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d 1558, 1561, 231 U.S.P.Q. 833, 834.
88. The fourth element of the combination stipulates that the calculator be contained
within a "pocket sized" housing. Id. at 1561, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 834.
89. See supra note 67.
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a. Input Means
The accused devices plainly possessed the "one set of decimal
number keys" claimed in the '921 patent, conflict stemmed from the
underlying operation of the keyboard. The '921 specification
teaches a method wherein pressure on a key causes a conductive
layer beneath the key to produce a unique binary signal that is en-
coded and transmitted. 90 In contrast, the accused keyboards uti-
lized a technology which scans the keyboard at time intervals and
determines which key is pressed. 91 The resultant signal is identical
to that used in the '921 patent. The ITC ruled that the keyboard
systems were not equivalent: they operated in substantially differ-
ent ways.
b. Electronic Means
The second means-plus-function element was an "integrated
semiconductor circuit array."' 92 The inventors described this as
means for "performing arithmetic calculations on the number en-
tered into the calculator and for generating control signals." 93 The
specification revealed an array of four integrated semiconductor cir-
cuits, three integrated semiconductor shift registers, and two resis-
tors interconnected by printed conductors located in one plane on
an insulating substrate. These discrete, interconnected devices were
contrasted to the equivalent means in the accused device.
The ITC ruled there was neither identity nor equivalence of
means for performing the electronic function since the accused de-
vices used a single integrated circuit. The ITC buttressed its deci-
sion by the fact that the accused devices used "MOS" technology,
as opposed to "bipolar" technology.94
90. Digital systems, such as a calculator, operate in a binary manner. That is, the com-
ponents of the system are in one of two states: on or off. The system's signals are comprised of
pulsed on-off states. See generally H. TAUB, DIGITAL CIRCUITS AND MICROPROCESSORS
(1982).
An encoder is an electronic device with a number of inputs. When one input is activated,
for instance by a key being pressed, the encoder generates a binary signal output comprising
various on-off states. Id. at 112-16.
91. Ironically, this technology is patented and assigned to TI. Texas Instruments, 805
F.2d at 1565, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 836.
92. It at 1566, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 837. A digital system is constructed through a variety
of related electronic circuit configurations. Those various circuits are integrated into a single
"package", "chip" or "integrated circuit." See generally J. MILLMAN, MICROELECTRONICS
DIGITAL AND ANALOG CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMs (1979).
93. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1566, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 837.
94. MOS (Metal Oxide Semiconductor) technology enjoys important advantages over




The display means exhibit the results of the calculations. The
specification of the '921 patent calls for a thermal printing means
whereby semiconductor heater elements are selectively energized to
create dots on heat sensitive tape. These dots form numbers and
symbols. The ITC maintained that the patent was limited to these
means; therefore, it concluded that the accused devices which em-
ployed Liquid Crystal Displays (hereinafter LCD) did not infringe
this element of the combination.
95
2. The Federal Circuit's Analysis
After setting forth the foregoing technological analysis, the
court ruled that by limiting each means to the embodiment shown
in the specification, the ITC interpreted the claims too narrowly. 6
The court went on to state: "While the scope of patent claims
under section 112 paragraph 6, is a legal determination, it is not
devoid of equitable considerations, particularly when determining
the breadth of 'means' claims on complex and rapidly-evolving
technologies." 97 The court pointed out that:
As an aid in determining the breadth of equivalents to be af-
forded means plus function clauses under section 112, the prose-
cution history, the other claims in the patent, expert testimony,
and the language of the asserted claims may be considered in
addition to the specification. The pioneer status of the invention
also requires consideration.
98
These considerations are balanced against the idea that:
There must be outer boundaries to the scope of these rules, as for
most rules, when the factual situation strains their rote applica-
tion and requires a fresh look at the rules in the new context in
which they are presented. There is no abstract guide to deter-
mining when a modified device crosses the boundary with respect
to the reasonable scope of patent claims. Indeed, the determina-
lower power dissipation, and smaller circuit size allowing higher circuit density. See generally
J. MILLMAN, MICROELECTRONICS DIGITAL AND ANALOG CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS (1979).
The inventors of the '921 used bipolar technology because at the time of their invention
"MOS was not yet reliable." Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1566, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 838. Thus,
the inventors would have utilized the new equivalent if it had been feasible. The ITC found
that MOS and bipolar transistor technology were not interchangeable because of differences
in surface area and power consumption. Id. That is, the new technology, although contem-
plated by the original inventors, was much more efficient, and thus, not an equivalent.
95. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1566, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 838.
96. See supra note 50.
97. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1569, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 839.
98. Id. at 1568, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 839.
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tion of infringement is not made in the abstract, but in the con-
text of the claimed invention and the accused devices. 99
The court then acknowledged that in light of the pioneering
nature of the invention, emphasis should be placed on the function
of each element, not the specific means for its realization. The court
stated that each of the claimed functions was present in the infring-
ing devices."°° The court also suggested that when each changed
means is considered separately, infringement occurs. Specifically,
the court stated: "we conclude that when each changed means is
considered separately, as part of the overall device as described by
the inventors, substantial evidence may not support the finding that
the resultant device is not an infringement of the '921 claims."'0 1
However, it went on to hold that:
It is not appropriate in this case, where all of the claimed func-
tions are performed in the accused devices by subsequently devel-
oped or improved means, to view each such change as if it were
the only change from the disclosed embodiments of the
invention....
... [V]iewing all of the modifications in the accused devices,
we conclude that they reflect more than mere substitution of 'an
embellishment made possible by [improved] technology'....
... [T]hese accumulated differences distinguish the accused
calculators from that contemplated in the '921 patent and tran-
scend a fair range of equivalents of the '921 invention....
We conclude that the total of the technological changes be-
yond what the inventors disclosed transcends the equitable limits
.... TI did not sustain its burden of proving infringement by the
accused calculators under 35 U.S.C. section 112 paragraph 6.102
Having considered the question of literal infringement, the
court considered whether there was infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents. The court stated:
Whether the issue is equivalency of a means that is described in
the specification to perform a function in a 'means' clause of a
combination claim (i.e., literal infringement), or equivalency to
99. Id. at 1569, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 839-40.
100. "TI correctly states and the ALJ so found, that every function described in the '921
patent claims is performed by the accused calculators. There was not substantial evidence to
the contrary." Id. at 1568, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 839.
101. Id. at 1569, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 840.
102. Id. at 1570-71, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 840-41.
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the claimed invention as a whole (Le., infringement by the doc-
trine of equivalents), the test is the same three-part test of his-
tory: does the asserted equivalent perform substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to accomplish substan-
tially the same result....
In the case of literal infringement of a claim containing a
'means' clause in terms of section 112 paragraph 6, the accused
structure, composition, or process is compared with that de-
scribed in the specification for performing the claimed function.
In the case of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the
accused structure, composition, or process is compared with the
claimed invention as a whole. 103
Subsequently, the court summarily ruled that in light of its previous
discussion of the extensive technological advances in all the claimed
functions, the accused devices were not equivalent under the doc-
trine of equivalents.
Three additional aspects of the decision are noteworthy. One,
the court "caution[ed] that the incentive to innovation that flows
from 'inventing around' an adversely held patent must be pre-
served."" °  The court also stated that "[w]e do not pass at all on
the infringement status of devices embodying less than the full com-
bination of changes."105 In addition, the court rejected the argu-
ment that in "fast-moving" arts alleged infringers should be liable
even if the improved elements substituted in the patented combina-
tion operate in a different way.106
3. The Federal Circuit's Discussion on Denial of
Rehearing
Petition for rehearing was denied.107 Although the court de-
nied rehearing, it nevertheless addressed the issues of pioneer pat-
ents, literal infringement, and the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
a. The Pioneer Patent Issue
TI argued that given its invention's pioneering status, its claims
should be given enhanced breadth, such that the extensive techno-
logical changes that have occurred since the invention was made
should be deemed not only functional equivalents but also struc-
103. Id. at 1571, 231 U.S.P.Q at 841.
104. Id. at 1572, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 842.
105. Id. at 1570, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 840.
106. Id.
107. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. US. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
1886 (Fed. Cir. 1988), rehearing in banc denied, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1414 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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tural equivalents in terms of 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph 6.
The court responded:
The judicially "liberal" view of both claim interpretation and
equivalency accorded a "pioneer" invention is not a manifesta-
tion of a different legal standard based on an abstract legal con-
cept denominated "pioneer." Rather, the "liberal" view flows
directly from the relative sparseness of prior art in nascent fields
of technology.,o 8
Thus, according to the court, pioneer status does not alter claim
interpretation nor equivalency analysis in an infringement
determination.
b. Literal Infringement
In its petition for rehearing, TI characterized the court as hold-
ing that "every claim element found corresponding equivalent
structure in the accused devices."109 The court clarified its position
stating:
[T]hough every function of the claimed combination was per-
formed in the accused devices, the structures performing those
functions were not equivalents of the structures disclosed in the
patent ....
... [T]he functions of input, electronics, and display, viewed
solely as functions, were in the calculator prior art; the patenta-
bility of the combination depended on the totality of changes in
the structure by which the functions were performed. (Indeed the
separate structures described in the '921 patent are individually
the subject of patents). It is the totality of means that achieved
the claimed pocket-sized calculator, as it is the totality of modi-
fied means that constitutes the accused calculators. Thus, the
equivalency of each changed means is evaluated in the context of
the accused device as a whole....
As in all cases involving assertions of equivalency,
wherein the patentee seeks to apply its claims to structures not
disclosed by the patentee, the court is required to exercise judg-
ment. In cases of complex inventions, the judgment must take
account of situations where the components of the claimed com-
bination are of varying importance or'are changed to varying de-
grees. This is done by viewing the components in
combination. 110
108. Id. at 1370, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1887.
109. Id. at 1371, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1888.
110. Id. at 1371, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1888-89 (emphasis in original).
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Thus, the court persisted in its view that under a literal infringe-
ment analysis one is compelled to view components in combination.
That is, elements must be equivalent individually and as they inter-
act in combination (or operate as a whole) before literal infringe-
ment exists.
c. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
The American Intellectual Property Association's amicus brief
suggested that the reverse doctrine of equivalents could have been
applied by the court. The court took exception to the suggestion,
stating:
[L]iteral infringement of means-plus-function claims requires
both that the same function be performed and that the same or
equivalent means be used. The reverse doctrine of equivalents
comes into consideration only when literal infringement is appar-
ent. Since the '921 claims are not literally infringed, the reverse
doctrine of equivalents does not apply."'
Thus, the court maintained that the TI claims did not "read on" the
accused device in such a manner as to establish literal infringement
- the condition precedent for a reverse doctrine of equivalents
analysis.
III. LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES AMIDST RAPIDLY EVOLVING
TECHNOLOGIES
As Texas Instruments examined infringement issues in the con-
text of a rapidly evolving technology, namely electronics, it is an
ideal window through which to view extant and forthcoming issues
of patent protection in rapidly evolving technologies. Particularly,
the case encompassed the issues of new equivalents, the reverse doc-
trine of equivalents, and the doctrine of equivalents. Attention now
turns to those individual issues.
A. New Equivalents
In its literal infringement analysis, the court strongly suggested
that the new equivalents, or new means, utilized in the allegedly
infringing calculators, when viewed individually, were equivalent to
those means used in the patented calculator.' 12 A suggestion, alone,
of the equivalency of the respective means was an unsatisfactory
111. Id. at 1372, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1889.
112. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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analysis on behalf of the court. 113 If equivalency was in fact pres-
ent, as the court suggested, then literal infringement existed. Con-
sequently, the court was presented with a situation similar to the
improved microprocessor means utilized in Hughes.14  That is,
notwithstanding the utilization of new equivalents, infringement
existed.
Unlike Hughes, where a single element was replaced, in Texas
Instruments three elements were replaced and equivalence was not
found. While the court in Texas Instruments intimated that
equivalents were present, it did not follow the precedent observed in
Hughes which dictates that new equivalents do not avoid
infringement.
Given the rulings in Hughes and Texas Instruments, ostensibly,
the Federal Circuit will find equivalence when one new equivalent is
introduced, but will balk when new equivalents are introduced for
all of the elements of the patented combination." 5 In the latter sit-
uation, a novel analysis is pursued. Specifically, it is not sufficient
for infringement purposes that the replaced elements individually
represent new equivalents. When multiple integration of new
equivalents is present, in addition to equivalence of corresponding
substituted elements, there must be a transcendence of a fair range
of equivalents. It is uncertain when a fair range of equivalents is
transcended. As the court acknowledged, "there is no abstract
113. The court was reviewing an administrative finding of fact: "The determination
whether an accused device is a section 112 equivalent of the described embodiment is a ques-
tion of fact." Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1357, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
1290, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In reviewing this finding of fact, the court merely needed to
determine whether the record could reasonably support the finding. See K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TEXT, Chap. 29 (3d ed. 1972). The court suggested that even this minimal
standard had not been met in the ITC's determination on 112 equivalents. See supra note 101
and accompanying text. In intimating a rejection of a finding of fact, which is normally
accepted as a matter of course, the court should have illuminated its reasoning. However, if
the court exposed its reasoning, it would have been compelled to acknowledge the individual
equivalency of the respective means. This finding would then dictate the conclusion which the
court suggested: the existence of literal infringement. Thus, by merely suggesting equivalency,
without explicitly deciding the issue, the court circumvented a finding of literal infringement.
114. See supra p. 90. However, Hughes considered equivalency in the context of the
doctrine of equivalents, not literal infringement.
115. A mode of analysis contingent upon the number of replaced elements has been criti-
cized: "The 'accumulated differences' language in the opinion is dangerous in that it tempts
trial courts to merely tally the number of altered elements in an accused device, thereby
substituting a mechanical, quantitative approach for equitable considerations." Loughran,
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission: The Federal Cir-
cuit's Prescription for Infringement Without Fear?, 5 COMPUTER L. REP. 512, 514 (1987).
The court treated the complete substitution of new equivalents as unique: "We do not
pass at all on the infringement status of devices embodying less than the full combination of
changes." Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1570, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 840.
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guide to determine when a modified device crosses the boundary
with respect to the reasonable scope of patent claims."116 Operating
pursuant to this nebulous standard, the court concluded in Texas
Instruments that the accused devices "transcend a fair range of
equivalents of the '921 invention." '117
This aspect of the holding introduces considerable uncertainty
into an infringement analysis. Naturally, in rapidly evolving tech-
nologies, there will be ongoing opportunities to replace elements in
a patented combination with new equivalents. Counseling clients as
to when their patent is infringed, or in the alternative, when their
competing product is infringing, entails entry into an ethereal realm
wherein one searches for a transcendence of a fair range of
equivalents. Consequently, the infringement analysis no longer ter-
minates when a straightforward substitution of new elements
occurs.
Another problem arising from Texas Instruments is that the
case muddles the taxonomy of "equivalents". The Federal Circuit
has emphasized that "equivalence" in terms of the doctrine of
equivalents is different from "equivalence" as it relates to
equivalents in a means-plus-function sense. 118 Namely, it has been
held that equitable ranges of equivalents are not considered in a
means-plus-function equivalence analysis. 1 9 However, in Texas In-
struments, the court stated that in interpreting means-plus-function
equivalents, especially in the areas of "complex and rapidly evolving
technologies," there are "equitable considerations." 120 Specifically,
the court indicated that "[tihe pioneer status of the invention also
116. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
118. Previously, equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents were determined by in-
quiry into the prosecution history, the pioneer or non-pioneer status of the invention and the
prior art. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. On the other hand, means-plus-function
equivalents were ascertained by considering the claim language, the patent specification, the
prosecution history, other claims in the patent and expert testimony. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
119. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
120. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1568-69, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 839. In Palumbo v. Don-
Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 975, n.4, 226 U.S.P.Q. 5, 8 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1985) the court stated,
"[there is a difference between a doctrine-of-equivalents analysis and a literal infringement
analysis involving 'equivalents' under section 112, [however] Graver Tank concepts of
equivalents are relevant in any 'equivalents' determination."
Thus, the concept that there are equitable considerations in a means-plus-function equiv-
alence analysis has previously surfaced. However, it is curious that Graver Tank concepts
could be authoritatively applied to a means-plus-function analysis. Graver Tank was a doc-
trine of equivalents case, the court's decision did not entail analysis of a means-plus-function
clause. Indeed, Graver Tank was decided prior to the statutory authorization of means-plus-
function clauses. Id.
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requires consideration." 121 If equitable considerations inform the
means-plus-function equivalence analysis, the difference between
the two types of equivalents is now uncertain.1 22
B. Literal Infringement and the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents
Precedent clearly establishes that claims are interpreted and
then applied to the accused device. 123 If the claims read on the ac-
cused device, literal infringement occurs.1 24 Liability can be cir-
cumvented by the application of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents. 125
In Texas Instruments, the court strongly suggested that the ele-
ments of the imported calculators, considered separately, employed
substituted new equivalents for each of the elements of the patented
combination.1 26  Consequently, the court implied that the claims
read directly on the imported calculators. In other words, there
was literal infringement. The reverse doctrine of equivalents should
have been utilized at that juncture.
The court did not find literal infringement because it failed to
complete its analysis which suggested that there was a substitution
of new equivalents for each element of the claims. 27 Instead of
answering this central question in its determination of literal in-
fringement, the couri engrafted an additional "device as a whole"
inquiry as part of its literal infringement analysis. It stated specifi-
cally that "the equivalency of each changed means is evaluated in
the context of the accused device as a whole."1 28
This "device as a whole" inquiry was undertaken before find-
121. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1568, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 839.
122. Judge Nies, in her dissenting opinion on denial of rehearing in banc, states that:
This court has not, in its case law, set out general guidelines with respect to
what consitutes an equivalent element either where section 112 6 is involved
or where it is not. It appears to be the intent of the Texas Instruments opinion
to provide such guidance where numerous changes have been made from the
disclosed embodiment of the invention and the elements of the claim are ex-
pressed in means-plus-function language.
Texas Instruments, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1415. Contrary, to the judge's suggestion, the court has
repeatedly proferred general guidelines to distinguish between the two types of equivalents.
See supra note 118. Clearly, Texas Instruments does not provide "guidance" on the difference
between the two types of equivalents, The case only obfuscated the issue.
123. See supra pp. 82-89.
124. See supra pp. 82-86.
125. See supra p. 86.
126. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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ing literal infringement. Curiously, this inquiry is suspiciously simi-
lar to a reverse doctrine of equivalents analysis. Application of the
reverse doctrine of equivalents requires a generalized inquiry into
the wholistic nature of the accused device to determine whether it is
"so far changed in principle" from the patented device that while
performing a similar function, it does so "in a substantially different
way."12 9 In other words, the court performed a reverse doctrine of
equivalents analysis before finding literal infringement.
The court was correct in stating that the reverse doctrine of
equivalents applies only when there is a finding of literal infringe-
ment. However, the court incorrectly undertook a reverse doctrine
of equivalents analysis before finding literal infringement.
The court's new literal infringement analysis is unsupported by
precedent."' Under the new analysis, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents will never be a meaningful inquiry after a finding of lit-
eral infringement, since the finding of literal infringement was al-
ready realized after a device as the whole inquiry.
The court's approach is also problematic because it places an
additional burden of proof upon the patentee. Once the claims are
deemed to cover the accused device, the patentee must come for-
ward once again to establish that the invention as a whole covers
the accused device, this additional burden of proof contravenes es-
tablished precedent."
C. The Doctrine of Equivalents
After failing to find literal infringement, the court considered
whether there was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
The court stated that "[iln the case of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents, the accused structure, composition, or process
129. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Note that the so-called 'reverse' doctrine can only be applied to the invention
viewed as a whole, since by definition all of the elements of the claim are liter-
ally present in the accused device, and the issue is whether the device as a
whole is so far changed that it nevertheless avoids infringement.
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 970 n.8, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1767
n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
130. In his concurring opinion on denial of rehearing, Judge Davis states: "[I] have
considered it proper to apply here an analogue or parallel of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents - though not that doctrine in and of itself." Texas Instruments, 846 F.2d at 1372,
6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1889. Why an unprecedented approach, which does not establish definitive
guidelines, would be "proper" is uncertain, at least to this commentator.
131. See supra note 58. See also American Intellectual Property Law Associations' Brief
for Amicus Curiae, Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n reprinted in Jan.-Feb.-
Mar. AIPLA BULLETIN, 52 (1987).
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is compared with the claimed invention as a whole." 132 Similarly,
in its recent opinion on denial of rehearing, it stated that the
"equivalency of each changed means is evaluated in the context of
the accused device as a whole."'133
The court had already undertaken this "invention as a whole"
type analysis as part of its literal infringement inquiry. Since the
court had factored equitable considerations into its means-plus-
function equivalence analysis, the question of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents was summarily disposed.
The Texas Instruments case thus introduces a literal infringe-
ment analysis which obviates the doctrine of equivalents analysis.
Through its "device as a whole" inquiry during its literal infringe-
ment analysis, the court concomitantly determines the issue of in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Given the nature of the doctrine of equivalents, it is curious
that the court in Texas Instruments would even undertake such an
analysis. The literal language of TI's claims was broad enough to
encompass the accused device.' 34 There was no need to expand the
scope of the claims as is done under the doctrine of equivalents.
Again, this intimates that the reasoning in Texas Instruments is
erroneous.
The Texas Instruments opinion on denial of rehearing rein-
troduces the conflict between the "invention as a whole" faction of
the Federal Circuit and the "element by element" faction.' 31 It was
thought that the issue was settled, but the court's opinion, stressing
132. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1571, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 841.
133. Texas Instruments, 846 F.2d at 1371, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1888. The reference to the
"device as a whole" in the rehearing opinion was in the context of its literal infringement
analysis. If the court is willing to undertake an invention as a whole analysis in its literal
infringement analysis, it is not unreasonable to suggest that such an analysis has not been
completely exorcised from the doctrine of equivalents realm. This observation is supported
by the fact that, while clearly called for, the court neglected to step back from the invention
as a whole doctrine. Judge Nies, in her dissenting opinion on denial of rehearing in bane,
argued that the case should have been accepted for rehearing insofar as "the original Texas
Instruments opinion appeared to adopt a different standard on infringement from that (ele-
ment-by-element approach] adopted in Pennwalt." Texas Instruments, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1415.
Judge Nies explained:
The Pennwait court rejected the view of a minority of the court that only literal
infringement required an element by element analysis, and that infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents could be found under an 'invention as a
whole' standard, even though an element of the claim was not present, at least
by an equivalent, in the accused device or process.
Id. The judge, ignoring the fact that Pennwalt was a split in bane decision, concluded opti-
mistically: "That debate has ended." Id.
134. See supra notes 101 and 113 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 133.
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its "invention as a whole" analysis, indicates that the issue still must
be resolved.
In addition to creating confusion on the new equivalents and
reverse doctrine of equivalents issues, this case also takes a step
backwards on the doctrine of equivalents issue. The uncertainty
created on all three fronts is disquieting. Moreover, other uncer-
tainties arise out of the case. Attention, therefore, turns to those
issues.
D. Texas Instruments and Pioneer Patents
The court acknowledged the TI invention as a pioneer patent
in the rapidly evolving electronic arts. It is ironic that the court
stated that the existence of a pioneer patent does not change the
infringement analysis,1 36 yet it proceeded to create a new literal in-
fringement test in response to its encounter with this pioneer patent.
The fact that the court extolled the patent as a pioneer and
then failed to enforce it is also noteworthy. The term pioneer patent
is vacuous when it fails to accord patent protection. 137  Texas In-
struments indicates that broad claims do not in fact provide exten-
sive protection in rapidly evolving arts.
Finaily, it is important to note that the claims for the TI inven-
tion were drafted in means-plus-function form. This form is
thought to offer the broadest protection, 138 but the court's holding
suggests that this expanded protection may be illusory.
IV. TOWARD A COGENT APPROACH
A. Literal Infringement and the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents
As set forth above, Texas Instruments should have been de-
cided as a reverse doctrine of equivalents case. In addition to the
reality that the factual circumstances in Texas Instruments de-
manded application of the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the equi-
136. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
137. In In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606, 194 U.S.P.Q. 527, 537 (C.C.P.A. 1977) the court
criticized: "a policy against broad protection for pioneer inventions, a policy both short-
sighted and unsound from the standpoint of promoting progress in the useful arts, the consti-
tutional purpose of the patent laws." Accord Loughran, Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United
States International Trade Commission: The Federal Circuit's Prescription For Infringement
Without Fear?, 5 COMPUTER L. REP. 515, wherein the author criticizes the court's emphasis
on the incentive to "invent around" a patent; the author states that an invention's pioneer
status should not be considered "a threat to others' 'incentive' rather than an accomplish-
ment that should be rewarded by the courts."
138. See supra note 55.
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table nature of the doctrine, grounded in its focus on enablement
considerations, is especially relevant in rapidly evolving technolo-
gies. The court bypassed an opportune context to herald the ex-
panded role the doctrine should exercise in rapidly evolving
technologies.
Instead of applying the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the
court in Texas Instruments discusses abstract notions of a "fair
range of equivalents"' 39 without focusing on the fact that it is en-
ablement which gives substance to the range of equivalents.
The court seemingly relied on enablement in its discussion of
equivalents, but failed to focus its holding upon it. Enablement
considerations should distinctly guide every equivalence analysis;
particularly in rapidly evolving technologies, the equivalence analy-
sis should be steered by enablement considerations. t4 0
The importance of enablement in the equivalence analysis is
closely related to the importance of enablement when considering a
pioneer patent. This relationship stems from the fact that a pioneer
patent is entitled to a broad range of equivalents. 141 The court failed
to cultivate the importance of enablement as the basis of broad
claims in pioneer patents by emphasizing that the broad claims as-
sociated with these patents stem from the "relative sparseness of
prior art in nascent fields of technology."' 142 That is, in light of the
paucity of prior art, the Patent Office granted broad claims. This
much is true; nevertheless, it should be moot in the context of the
court's analysis. The court should not be concerned with how a
sparseness of prior art resulted in broad claims being issued. The
court's role in infringement litigation is to determine whether broad
protection is warranted; in other words, whether the broad claims
are supported by broad enablement in the specification. 43 As in the
case of its equivalence analysis, the court's treatment of the pioneer
139. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
140. In S. BENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE
253 (1987), the authors state:
Especially as applied to biotechnology inventions, we believe that the standard
of enablement (that which the patentee has taught others to do without their
own exercise of inventive effort) is the principle criterion applicable to the de-
termination of equivalents. The enablement concept appears to be a unifying
principle which underlies, for example, both doctrine of equivalents and reverse
equivalents determinations under U.S. practice. (emphasis in original).
141. See supra note 67.
142. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
143. No one expects the art to stay the same for the whole seventeen year term of
the patent. If the patent is to mean anything at all while the state of the art
marches on, it has to be interpreted in light of later developments - and only a
court can do this.
[Vol. 6
1990] PATENTINFRJNGEMET . 105
patent issue was flawed in its failure to generate a proper emphasis
on enablement.
The Texas Instruments holding seems less confounding when
viewed in light of enablement considerations. That is, since the TI
calculator failed to enable the imported calculators, infringement
did not occur. The electronic means in the accused device was a
single integrated circuit, as opposed to the discrete elements in the
patented calculator. The sophistication of an integrated circuit
stands in stark contrast to the discrete elements of the original cal-
culator. Similarly, the LCD is a dramatic improvement over what
appears to us now as the fatuous thermal printing means of the TI
device. Finally, the electronic scanning method of the accused de-
vices appears to be a salient improvement over the manual conduc-
tive connection of the original calculator.
Since the imported devices were manifestly more sophisticated
than the technology revealed in the TI patent application, it was
unjust for TI to claim proprietary protection for technology it had
not enabled. "Broad protection must be earned by broad direc-
tion." 44 Since the TI patent was no longer providing enablement in
electronic calculator technology, it should not have been placed in a
position to foreclose advancements in that useful art. Viewed in
this way, the result in Texas Instruments is reasonable.45
Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts - Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 608, 631 (1988).
The court's analysis in this context assumes elevated importance since it is interpreting
broad claims; the analysis is likely to result in a narrowing of the effective boundaries of those
claims:
A one percent expansion or reduction of a description of North America has
dramatically greater total gross significance than a one percent expansion or
reduction of a description of a residential lot most of us might live on. Further,
any initial description of North America after its discovery is much more likely
to be subject to error than a description of a residential lot in a housing
development.
Bozicevic, The 'Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents' in the World of Reverse Transcriptase, 71 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'y 353, 370 (1989).
144. Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babckock and Wilcox Co., 512 F. Supp. 792, 809, 210
U.S.P.Q. 232, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
145. At least one commentator has argued that the result is not reasonable: "It would
seem that piracy has been mistaken for innovation in this opinion, where success in 'inventing
around' is determined by the number of modifications used in an accused device without
regard to their obviousness, then or now." Loughran, Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States
International Trade Commission: The Federal Circuit's Prescription For Infringement With-
out Fear?, 5 COMPUTER L. REP. 512, 513 (1987). See Texas Instruments brief for rehearing
reprinted in 5 COMPUTER L. REP. 610, 616 (1987) "[Tlhere is no evidence in this case that
the Hong Kong respondents did any 'inventing around' to come up with the infringing prod-
ucts. They simply copied technology which has been developed and improved by others (in-
cluding Texas Instruments) and cannot be viewed sympathetically as innovators." Id.
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The court's holding flares the clear signal that without con-
comitant enablement it will not allow broad claims to forestall the
march of progress. While the TI application provided proper en-
ablement for the claims at the time of filing, subsequent develop-
ments in the rapidly evolving electronic arts resulted in new
meaning for those claims: The claims fortuitously covered a host of
developments never contemplated in the patent. Those develop-
ments could not be used against TI at the time of infringement to
display a lack of enablement for its claims, thus, TI should not be
heard to plea that its claims nevertheless cover the new
technology.
146
Consequently, as witnessed in Texas Instruments and the open-
ing hypothetical, a paradox is present in patent law's rapidly evolv-
ing technologies. Broad claims may be valid, may encompass an
accused device, but nevertheless result in an equitable finding of
noninfringement.
This paradox is compelled by the ideology that patents are to
promote the progress of the useful arts. Progress is fostered when
creative activity is remunerated. Such compensation, however,
should not result in the windfall that ensues when rapidly evolving
technology conveniently falls within the scope of a claim issued in
the infancy of a technology. In this situation, a disincentive to re-
search is created and the professed universal benefit of the patent
system is suspect.
As a result, patent claims in rapidly evolving technologies can-
not be taken at their face value. It would be imprudent for a patent
holder to blindly depend upon broad claims which serendipitously
cover a myriad of technologies developed subsequent to issuance of
the patent.
Thus, there is the quandary of how to accurately gauge the
scope of patent claims in rapidly evolving technologies. The Texas
Instruments decision, unfortunately, is of no help. The court failed
to apply the reverse doctrine of equivalents when it was plainly
called for and instead promulgated a new test of unknown
parameters.
146. Note that the claims are valid despite the fact that they are so broad that they cover
technology well-beyond the scope of enablement provided in the specification. This lack of
enablement does not render the claims invalid. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607, 194 U.S.P.Q.
527, 538 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("The courts have consistently considered subsequently existing
state of the art as raising questions of infringement, but never of validity .... If in the light of
all proper evidence, the invention claimed be clearly enabled as of [the date of filing], the
inquiry under [enablement] is at an end."); See Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing
Arts-Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 608 (1988).
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Despite the court's protestations to the contrary, Texas Instru-
ments is best viewed as a reverse doctrine of equivalents case. The
court suggested, without deciding, that there existed new
equivalents for each element of the claims, thereby indicating literal
infringement. What the court called a device as a whole inquiry
pursuant to its literal infringement analysis was, in reality ,a reverse
doctrine of equivalents analysis.147
Interpretation of the case in this manner is not inconsistent
with the court's result. More importantly, viewed in this way,
Texas Instrument provides a framework by which one may inter-
pret claims in rapidly evolving technologies. As a reverse doctrine
of equivalents case, it falls into an established line of precedent with
familiar parameters.
The reverse doctrine of equivalents' focus on enablement will
provide a definitive context in which to judge claim scope. In fact,
only enablement can narrow the broad claims routinely issued in a
rapidly evolving art.148 Thus, under the reverse doctrine of
equivalents' enablement standard, a patentee will not enjoy benefits
he does not bestow.
Under this approach, claim interpretation will be more predict-
able as the claims will represent a definitive outer periphery.
Although the outer periphery of the claims will be definitive, claim
breadth will be subject to a de facto contraction in light of the re-
verse doctrine of equivalents. The extent of contraction is gauged in
light of enablement considerations.
The foregoing reasons clearly suggest that the reverse doctrine
of equivalents can, and should, play a large role in infringement
analyses in rapidly evolving technologies.149 The doctrine allows
147. See supra pp. 100-101. Accord Nieman, The Federal Circuit Resolves Ambiguities in
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 153 (1988).
148. A claim is construed in light of the claim language, the other claims, the prosecu-
tion history and the specification. See supra pp. 82-85. In a pioneer patent the claim language
is broad and the prosecution history will be slim because there is little prior art on which the
examiner may base rejections or which can be used to narrow the claims. Thus, only the
specification remains available to narrow the scope of the claims.
149. "The reverse doctrine of equivalents will likely come into its heyday in the context
of biotechnology patents, in view of the favored use of functional and 'means plus function'
claims limitations to secure broad claims." K. ADAMO, ADJUDICATING INFRINGEMENT IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT CASES - OUT WITH THE OLD RULES, IN WITH THE NEW? 74
(manuscript associated with 32nd Annual Conference On More Developments In Intellectual
Property Law - The John Marshall Law School Center For Intellectual Property Law); See
Bozicevic, The 'Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents' in the World of Reverse Transcriptase, 71 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 353 (1989); Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts
- Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 608 (1988).
The Federal Circuit has never relieved an accused infringer under the reverse doctrine of
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accurate demarcation of claim scope and provides adequate protec-
tion for enabled matter while not foreclosing the advancement of
the useful arts when claim breadth is inconsistent with enablement.
The Federal Circuit's response to its first case dealing with a
true pioneer patent in a rapidly evolving technology was to disre-
gard precedent and fabricate a new infringement analysis. The
court should retreat from its approach in Texas Instruments. In
subsequent cases considering patent protection in rapidly evolving
technologies, the court should acknowledge the important role the
reverse doctrine of equivalents can serve.
B. New Equivalents
Prior to Texas Instruments it was clear that substitution of a
new equivalent into a combination did not avoid infringement. Af-
ter the decision one is compelled to undertake a novel determina-
tion of whether the substituted element or elements, as a whole,
transcend a "fair range of equivalents." The case also introduces the
proposition that in determining means-plus-function equivalents en
route to a literal infringement determination, equitable considera-
tions are entertained. Thus, there are now equitable considerations
in a literal infringement analysis and the difference between the two
types of equivalents is uncertain. Further, the problem of constru-
ing means-plus-function equivalents without reference to the ac-
cused device persists.
Although these issues must be resolved in future litigation,
within the court's Texas Instruments decision is the seed of a rea-
sonable denouement. In the decision, the court acknowledged that
in light of equitable considerations, the equivalent means of each
means-plus-function equivalent should be interpreted as nearly all
means which perform the stated function. 5' The court should take
this reasoning a step further. When construing combination claims
with multiple means-plus-function elements, the court should sim-
ply look for identity of individual functions. If all functions of a
equivalents. The court has stated: "It is possible, of course, for a claim to be literally but not
actually infringed, where, for example, a claim may be 'read on' a structure having no rela-
tion to the invention. Instances are rare." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, 714 F.2d 1110,
1115 n.3, 219 U.S.P.Q. 185, 188 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Instances of identical structure resulting
in non-equivalence may be rare, however, a focus on identical functions would expand the
utilization of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. See infra pp. 108-110. Note that enable-
ment is a question of law. United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d. 778, 785, 8
U.S.P.Q.2d 1217, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1988). As such, the district court finding on enablement
will be more readily overturned.
150. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1569, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 840.
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claim are found in the accused device, literal infringement should
result. At this point, a reverse doctrine of equivalents analysis,
with its equitable considerations, should be undertaken.
Under this proposed approach, the court does not have to fac-
tor equitable considerations into its literal infringement analysis.
The equitable considerations are subsumed in the reverse doctrine
of equivalents analysis.
In addition, it would be far easier for the practitioner and the
trier of fact to first consider whether the new equivalent represents
the same function as that performed in the patented device. A func-
tion is easily defined. For instance, in Texas Instruments one would
simply consider whether the LCD was a functional equivalent to
the thermal printing means. That is, whether they both served the
function of displaying the result of a calculation.
I Equivalent structures to the means of a means-plus-function
element are essentially impossible to define; this is especially true
when there is no reference to the accused device, as is required in
proper claim construction. 51 In other words, relying on the previ-
ous example, in proper claim construction, one would be forced to
hypothesize as to equivalent structural means to the thermal print-
ing means. Without reference to the LCD of the accused device, a
non-technologically trained judge or jury is forced to hypothesize or
invent a physical structure which could be used as an equivalent to
the claimed means.
In a pragmatic scheme, there is a search for functional equiva-
lence.152 If the trier of fact does find functional equivalence, then a
more difficult task is undertaken: determining equivalent structure
in light of equitable considerations. However, in this context, the
151. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
152. In Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
1737, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987) the court rejected the argument that "if an accused structure
performs the function required by the claim, it is per se structurally equivalent," This propo-
sition was also rejected in the opinion on denial of rehearing. Texas Instruments, 846 F.2d at
1371, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1888. The author is not attempting to resurrect the rejected proposi-
tion that functional equivalence is tantamount to structural equivalence. Rather, it is sug-
gested that functional equivalence be temporarily deemed literal equivalence in a literal
infringement, analysis. Subsequently, a determination of structural equivalence may be un-
dertaken in the reverse doctrine of equivalents context.
A determination of functional equivalence is already integral.to the infringement analy-
sis: "A finding of literal infringement of a claim expressed in terms of a series of means for
performing particular functions... involves interpreting the claim to define the recited func-
tion. If, as a threshold matter, the recited functions are not performed by the accused device,
there can be no literal infringement." Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v. Schubert & Salzer, 829
F.2d 1075, 1085, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1044, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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determination of equivalence of structure is guided by the reverse
doctrine of equivalents and its enablement considerations.
While this approach may expand the breadth of the claims in
initially determining literal infringement, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents analysis will subsequently generate a focus on enable-
ment limits and provide only that protection which is warranted.
Consequently, there is no basis to fear that a patentee will enjoy
undue protection, that is, protection approximating the function of
the claim.15 3
In addition, under this approach, one need not encounter the
questions of whether all elements of the combination were replaced
with new equivalents or whether the accused device satisfies a new
"transcendence of a fair range of equivalents" test. Instead, after a
finding that the substituted elements are equivalent in function to
the old elements, the court can simply apply the familiar vehicle of
the reverse doctrine of equivalents to determine whether infringe-
ment is avoided. In this way, the issue of new equivalents falls into
a familiar analysis.
C. The Doctrine of Equivalents
Texas Instruments should have been decided in terms of literal
infringement and the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Thus, the
doctrine of equivalents issue should have been avoided altogether.
Instead, the court generated considerable confusion in the patent
community with its doctrine of equivalents "invention as a whole"
analysis. This confusion must be rectified in future litigation. 154
That litigation is unlikely to be resolved in the area of rapidly
evolving technologies since the doctrine of equivalents should not
exercise a large role in this context. As discussed, the claims in this
area, issued in the infancy of a technology, are generally broad and
the specifications supporting the claims are relatively narrow. Since
the claims are broad there will be more findings of literal infringe-
ment (and subsequent reverse doctrine of equivalents analyses).
153. In Texas Instruments, the court allowed equivalence approximating the function of
the claim. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. Despite the nearly functional equiva-
lence apportioned, in the end, protection was limited since there was a finding of noninfringe-
ment. "The outcome is likely to be the same whether infringement is found by literal
interpretation of the claim language as of a later date or by the 'doctrine of equivalents'
applied to claim language objectively interpreted to have a frozen meaning as of the filing
date." Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts -Biotechnology, 70 3. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. Soc'y 608, 631 (1988).
154. See supra note 133. If the element by element faction has in ct prevailed, then a
doctrine of equivalence analysis entails an element by element inquiry, while pursuant to
Texas Instruments, a literal infringement analysis entails a device as a whole inquiryl
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Furthermore, because of the relatively narrow specifications in this
area, there is little room for expanding claims as is done under the
doctrine of equivalents.
When the doctrine is applied in this realm, there should be a
careful inquiry for disguised elements. Evolving technologies will
allow the combination of functions into a single means.155 A cur-
sory application of the claims to an accused device may not reveal
literal infringement. Infringement, however, may follow under the
doctrine of equivalents once disguised elements or combined func-
tions are uncovered.
V. CONCLUSION
Patent protection amidst rapidly evolving technologies is prob-
lematic. Patents issued in rapidly evolving areas tend to be broad
enough to cover subsequent advances in those areas. As a result,
there is a disincentive to further research. On the other hand, as
displayed in Texas Instruments, the enforceability of those broad
claims is questionable. Consequently, the extent of patent protec-
tion amidst rapidly evolving technologies is difficult to ascertain.
Faced with a specific instance of patent protection amidst a
rapidly evolving technology, the Federal Circuit, in Texas Instru-
ments, ostensibly created a novel infringement analysis. To avoid
this departure from precedent and the uncertainty it introduces in
construing patent claims in this area, it has been argued that the
case is best interpreted in light of the reverse doctrine of
equivalents. The reverse doctrine of equivalents and its focus on
enablement should be increasingly invoked to limit broad claims
which literally cover the numerous advances in a rapidly evolving
technology.
The reverse doctrine of equivalents should also be relied upon
in approaching the problem of new equivalents. Instead of the in-
herently difficult, if not impossible, task of construing equivalents
without reference to the accused device, it has been argued that only
the function of the substituted element be considered. If literal in-
fringement results, then a reverse doctrine of equivalents analysis is
undertaken, this analysis will focus on enablement limits. Thus, the
metes and bounds of the patent are clear to an outer extent,
although they may be limited in light of the specification. This ap-
proach lends certainty to claim interpretation.
155. For instance, in Hughes, supra p. 90, the microprocessor alone performed a number
of steps which were previously undertaken as discrete steps.
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The doctrine of equivalents should not play a large role in rap-
idly evolving technologies. The claims issued in this realm are gen-
erally broad. As a result, there will be more findings of literal
infringement. Moreover, the courts should not be inclined to ex-
pand claims which are relatively broad in contrast to their degree of
enablement. In addition, the doctrine will receive even less atten-
tion if the author's proposal for expanded utilization of literal in-
fringement and the reverse doctrine of equivalents is realized.
Whether applying the doctrine of equivalents or the reverse
doctrine of equivalents, the analysis should be informed by enable-
ment considerations. In rapidly evolving technologies enablement
considerations, as opposed to claim language, will define claim
scope. Consequently, consistent with its underlying ideology, the
patent system will reward an inventor only for the degree of enable-
ment he or she has provided and thereby reward inventive activity
without frustrating additional progress.
